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New Approaches to Enforcing Labor Standards: 
How Co-enforcement Partnerships between 
Government and Civil Society Are Showing the 
Way Forward 
Janice Fine† 
INTRODUCTION: ENFORCEMENT IN CRISIS 
For many low-wage workers, non-compliance with basic labor 
standards and health and safety laws by businesses of all sizes has be-
come the new normal. In 2013, an average of eighty-eight workers died 
on the job every single week—more than twelve workers a day.1 For-
eign-born Latinos were especially vulnerable, averaging fifteen deaths 
a week. Many workplace injuries are preventable: in 2014, there were 
more than 6000 OSHA citations issued for businesses lacking fall pro-
tection for their workers, over 5000 for not communicating dangerous 
workplace hazards, 4000 for not having proper scaffolding, and over 
3000 for not providing adequate respiratory protection. 
In addition to workplace hazards, wage theft is rife in low-wage 
sectors. A 2009 study in the nation’s three largest cities—New York, 
Chicago, and Los Angeles—found that 26% of workers2 suffered mini-
mum wage violations in the week prior to being surveyed, and that over 
76% of those who had labored more than forty hours in the prior week 
had not been paid according to overtime laws.3 In some regions, the US 
Department of Labor (DOL) itself recorded Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA) compliance levels below 50% in industries such as nursing 
 
 † Associate Professor at Rutgers University School of Management and Labor Relations; Re-
search and Strategy Director at the Center for Innovation in Worker Organization (CIWO). Re-
search on the cases discussed in this paper was made possible by a grant from the LIFT Fund. 
 1 Rebecca Thiess, The Future of Work: Trends and Challenges for Low-Wage Workers, ECON. 
POL’Y INST. (April 27, 2012), http://www.epi.org/publication/bp341-future-of-work/ [https://perma. 
cc/TN4T-PNC9]. 
 2 Steven Greenhouse, Low-Wage Workers Are Often Cheated, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
1, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/02/us/02wage.html [https://perma.cc/VV7Q-R6YA]. 
 3 NAT’L EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, LOCAL LIVING WAGE LAWS AND COVERAGE (July 2011), 
http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/LocalLWLawsCoverageFINAL.pdf?nocdn=1 [https: 
//perma.cc/TM9T-9BFF]. 
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homes, poultry processing, daycare, and restaurants.4 In 2013, the 
Southern Poverty Law Center found that 41% of Latino immigrants 
working in the agriculture, construction, hospitality, and poultry pro-
cessing industries in Nashville, Charlotte, New Orleans, rural southern 
Georgia and several towns and cities in northern Alabama had also ex-
perienced wage theft. In New Orleans, a staggering 80% of workers sur-
veyed reported having experienced wage theft.5 Most recently, in a 
study conducted on behalf of the DOL, the Eastern Research Group 
found that in 2014 between 3.5 and 6.5% of all wage and salary workers 
in California and New York were paid less than the minimum wage and 
estimated that more than 300,000 workers in every state suffered min-
imum-wage violations each month.6 Why is non-compliance in certain 
sectors so high? 
Firms comply with health and safety and minimum wage laws for 
one of three reasons: 1) economic—it costs them less to comply than to 
risk fines and penalties; 2) social—they don’t want to be unfavorably 
compared to others in their industry; and 3) normative—they believe it 
is the right thing to do.7 Unfortunately, for too many employers of low-
wage workers, economic motives overwhelm the social and normative. 
The desire to cut costs and limit liability has contributed to the “fissur-
ing” of the employment relationship8 in which companies have shifted 
direct employment of workers to other business entities through height-
ened subcontracting, increased use of fixed-term contracts, temporary 
staffing agencies and independent contracting arrangements. In reac-
tion to tight competition and thinner profit margins, subcontractors are 
strongly incentivized to cut costs wherever they can and low-road prac-
tices have become normalized across many labor markets. Those firms 
that want to maintain higher standards are placed at an enormous dis-
advantage. A systemic transformation is needed. 
 
 4 What’s the Minimum Wage in your State?, RAISE THE MINIMUM WAGE, http://raisethemini 
mumwage.com/minimum-wage-state/ [https://perma.cc/TE2L-6LG8]. 
 5 S. POVERTY LAW CTR., UNDER SIEGE: LIFE FOR LOW-INCOME LATINOS IN THE SOUTH (Mar. 
31, 2009), https://www.splcenter.org/20090401/under-siege-life-low-income-latinos-south [https:// 
perma.cc/MF8D-BVG4]. 
 6 E. RESEARCH GROUP, INC., THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF WAGE VIOLATIONS: 
ESTIMATES FOR CALIFORNIA AND NEW YORK (Dec. 2014), https://www.dol.gov/asp/evaluation/com 
pleted-studies/WageViolationsReportDecember2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/JD2H-KV5H]. 
 7 Robert A. Kagan et al., Fear, Duty and Regulatory Compliance: Lessons from Three Research 
Projects, in EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION, 37–58 (Christine 
Parker and Vibeke Lehmann eds., 2011). 
 8 DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND 
WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014). 
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To increase compliance, Wage and Hour Division (WHD) has been 
targeting specific high-risk industries in which there is a lot of subcon-
tracting, independent contracting and reliance on temporary workers 
for intensive inspection. WHD’s strategic enforcement strategy entails 
focusing at the top of industry structures, targeting entire business en-
tities rather than individual workplaces, holding joint employers liable 
for violations and expanding the use of the “hot goods” provision of 
FLSA.9 This strategy targets highly non-compliant industries and takes 
advantage of industry-specific dynamics and structures to impact net-
works of interconnected employers. In strategic enforcement, the 
agency also analyzes the regulatory regimes under which specific in-
dustries operate and retrofits the enforcement approach to utilize the 
specific pressure points created by these laws and regulations. 
Complaint-based enforcement had been the dominant approach 
taken by the federal government for many years, but by FY 2012, di-
rected investigations based on strategic enforcement accounted for over 
40% of the total and by FY 2015, it had climbed to a remarkable 46%. 
These numbers are unprecedented in the history of the WHD and the 
ascendance of strategic enforcement into a co-equal position with com-
plaint-based enforcement is a major step forward. However, this paper 
argues that for strategic enforcement to fulfill its promise, there must 
be a means for workers, worker organizations, and high road firms to 
take part. 
Government does not, and likely will not ever, have enough inves-
tigators to monitor US establishments.10 But, it is also true that gov-
ernment is very unlikely to have as much information about conditions 
on the ground as workers in the workplace do, or have the relationships 
with vulnerable workers that strong organizations have. Nevertheless, 
most proposals to improve labor standards enforcement in recent years 
focus attention away from the latent resources in society that are es-
sential for responding to the crisis of enforcement, often relegating 
workers to passive victims and worker organizations to providing arms-
length political support for enforcement and little else. 
Effective deterrence in low wage sectors necessitates co-enforce-
ment: worker, worker organization, and high road firm participation in 
enforcement, and greater transparency between government, workers 
and worker organizations. Without the tacit knowledge that workers 
 
 9 US DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., FY 2012 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 
(2011), https://www.dol.gov/dol/budget/2012/PDF/CBJ-2012-V2-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/FX2T-LF 
QG]. 
 10 ANNETTE BERNHARDT & SIOBHÁN MCGRATH, TRENDS IN WAGE AND HOUR ENFORCEMENT BY 
THE US DEPT. OF LABOR, 1975-2004 (Sept. 2005), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/ 
legacy/d/download_file_35553.pdf [https://perma.cc/66FX-9GK7]. 
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have about workplace practices and problems and the relationships 
they have with worker organizations, government will never have the 
trust required for vulnerable workers to come forward, nor the infor-
mation they can provide as a result. 
A broad attack on the problem of noncompliance in low-wage work 
requires serious reconsideration of a formal role for workers and work-
ers’ organizations in government enforcement efforts. Routine, institu-
tionalized collaborations between these organizations and federal, state 
and local Departments of Labor has the potential to address many of 
the gaps identified in government efforts to enforce labor standards in 
the low-wage context. Previous research by Fine and Gordon (2010) and 
Fine (2013), profiled several contemporary examples of tripartism at 
the local, state and federal levels. Support from the LIFT Fund in 2014 
made the exploration of additional cases—now viewed through the lens 
of a conceptual framework of co-enforcement—possible.11 
The paper proceeds as follows: Part I provides a brief literature re-
view that situates our proposal in the scholarly literature, Part II is an 
elaboration of the key design principles, Part III provides two contem-
porary case studies at the federal, state, and local levels, and Part IV 
provides a cross-case analysis and conclusions. 
I. CO-ENFORCEMENT IN CONTEXT12 
Co-enforcement is when unions, worker centers and other commu-
nity-based non-profit organizations and high-road firms, in relationship 
with government inspectors, help educate workers on their rights and 
patrol their labor markets to identify businesses engaged in unethical 
and illegal practices.13 In contrast to government contracting with a 
 
 11 See generally Janice Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards in Partnership with Civil Society: 
Can Co-enforcement Succeed Where the State Alone Has Failed?, 45 POL. & SOC’Y 359 (2017). 
 12 See generally JANICE FINE, CO-PRODUCTION: BRINGING TOGETHER THE UNIQUE CAPA-
BILITIES OF GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY FOR STRONGER LABOR STANDARDS AND ENFORCEMENT 
(2013), http://theliftfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LIFTReportCoproductionOct_ExecSum 
m-rf_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/VFQ6-CS3T]; Fine, supra note 11. 
 13 Co-enforcement as put forward in this paper was developed by Amengual and Fine, draws 
heavily upon Fine and Gordon, from Josh Cohen and Joel Rogers’ proposals about associative de-
mocracy as well as tripartism as envisioned by Ayres and Braithwaite. See Ian Ayres & John 
Braithwaite, Chapter 3: Tripartism, in RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); Anuradha Joshi & Mick Moore, Institutionalized Co-production: 
Unorthodox Public Service Delivery in Challenging Environments, 40 J. OF DEV. STUD. 31, 40 
(2004); FINE, supra note 12; Tony Bovaird, Beyond Engagement and Participation: User and Com-
munity Coproduction of Public Services, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 846–60 (2007); Joshua Cohen & Joel 
Rogers, Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance, 20 POL. & SOC’Y 393–472 (1992); 
Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement through Partner-
ships with Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 552–85 (2010); Elinor Ostrom, Crossing the 
Great Divide: Co-Enforcement, Synergy and Development, 24 WORLD DEV. 1073–87 (1996). 
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third party to take over a service previously delivered by a government 
agency, co-enforcement is intended to complement rather than replace 
government enforcement capacity. 
With co-enforcement, we shift from conceptualizing state capacity 
for enforcement as arising primarily from regulators with coercive pow-
ers, to conceptualizing state capacity as a process of negotiated interde-
pendence between regulators and societal organizations (Mann 1993, 
Weiss 1998, Pedriana and Stryker 2004). This idea has been of greatest 
interest to development scholars who have long puzzled over service de-
livery under conditions of weak state capacity, but it has not been ap-
plied to labor standards enforcement. 
Pushing back against theoretically and practically rigid boundaries 
between state, market, and civil society, Ostrom (1996) defined co-pro-
duction as “the process through which inputs used to produce a good or 
service are contributed by individuals who are not ‘in’ the same organi-
zation.”14 Ostrom argues that all public goods and services are not only 
potentially produced by the regular producer—often government—but 
also by those who are the consumer of the service—often referred to as 
the client. The production of a service is frequently difficult to carry out 
without the active participation of the client.15 Drawing upon case stud-
ies of water, sanitation and education systems in Brazil and Nigeria, 
Ostrom found that incentivizing citizen participation in the design and 
maintenance of urban infrastructural development projects made the 
efforts of public officials more efficacious and contributed to higher lev-
els of welfare. Strikingly, Ostrom found that these co-production pro-
jects were most likely to succeed if they were formalized with clear and 
enforceable contracts.16 
Building upon Ostrom’s co-production proposals, Joshi and Moore 
(J&M 2004) argued that privatization and contracting out’s failure to 
effectively deliver public services indicated a new model could be dis-
cerned. This model would have a “preferential shift away from stand-
ardized (central) state provision toward recognition of, and sympathy 
for . . . diversity, experimentation and multi-actor arrangements.”17 
J&M described institutionalized co-production as “the provision of pub-
lic services (broadly defined to include regulation) through a regular, 
long-term relationship between state agencies and organized groups of 
 
 14 Ostrom, supra note 13, at 1073. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 1082. 
 17 Joshi & Moore, supra note 13, at 32. 
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citizens, where both make substantial resource contributions.” 18 In con-
trast to Ostrom’s requirement of formality, J&M argued that institu-
tionalized co-production could be contractual or non-contractual and in-
formal and that it could be renegotiated almost continuously as long as 
it was of a long-term nature.19 
Ostrom, J&M and other scholars mostly studied co-production in 
the context of public service delivery and advanced it as a strategy in 
countries where state authority is weak. However, co-production can 
also be a useful way of thinking about labor standards enforcement, and 
not only in countries where state authority is weak, but also where it is 
strong but inspection capacity and trust in government is weak. 
In addition to the co-production literature, this proposal builds 
upon the concept of republican tripartism advanced by Ayres and 
Braithwaite (A&B) and further developed by Fine and Gordon in the 
labor standards enforcement literature. Seeking to take full advantage 
of the gains that accrue from repeat encounters and cooperation over 
time between regulators and firms while avoiding the heightened risk 
of capture and corruption of the regulator by the firm that close cooper-
ation engenders, A&B advocate for a regulatory process that provides 
for the full and equal participation of a public interest group (PIG) in 
enforcement.20 Like Ostrom, A&B’s PIG plays a formal and ongoing role 
in enforcement and is granted full access to all information available to 
the regulator, a seat at the table when the firm and agency are negoti-
ating, and the same standing to sue or prosecute under the regulatory 
statute as the regulator.21 The presence of empowered PIGs radically 
limits the firm’s ability to capture the regulator because it now must 
capture the PIGs as well as the agency officials.22 Additionally, PIGs 
prevent capture and corruption by enforcing a meta-norm of punishing 
regulators who fail to punish noncompliance.23 A&B argue that where 
there is no power base and no information base for the weaker party, 
 
 18 Id. at 40. 
 19 See generally id. 
 20 See generally Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 13. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Ostrom makes a similar argument: 
If the remedy to corruption is seen as the creation of strict bureaucratic structure to 
separate the servants of the public from the public, it is likely that behind the closed 
doors of a centralized system corrupt practices can flourish without much fear of expo-
sure. . . . When public officials and the citizens they are supposed to serve work to-
gether . . . productivity can be higher and all forms of opportunistic behavior are more 
likely to be exposed, but never totally eliminated. 
Ostrom, supra note 13, at 1083. 
 23 See generally Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 13. 
07 FINE PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/17/17  8:23 PM 
143] ENFORCING LABOR STANDARDS 149 
 
tripartism will not work.24 To play their role effectively, PIG’s must re-
ceive public funding.25 
Finally, these ideas about the critical relational and process dimen-
sions of co-enforcement draw upon some collaborative governance (CG) 
ideas.26 More than either co-production or tripartism, CG focuses on the 
actual processes through which public agencies work with non-state 
stakeholders to make or implement public policy or manage public pro-
grams or assets. CG emphasizes decision-making processes that are for-
mal, consensus-oriented and deliberative. In contradistinction to tripar-
tism, where one PIG is selected to play a role or corporatism and peak 
bargaining takes place between the state and peak associations of labor 
and capital,27 CG includes a broader range of stakeholders who seldom 
have a representative monopoly over their sectors.28 
II. THE FOUR DESIGN PRINCIPLES OF CO-ENFORCEMENT 
A. Principle #1: Recognize and Leverage the Unique, 
Non-substitutable Capabilities of State and Society 
At first glance, studying co-enforcement appears to be an exercise 
in mapping out ways in which worker organizations and state regula-
tors have an additive effect. Worker organizations might improve en-
forcement, for example, by providing in kind support to inspectors in 
the form of transportation. In these circumstances, enforcement itself 
is not materially changed, just augmented. Such inputs are important, 
but they are largely “substitutable.”29 When regulators could provide 
the exact same “inputs” as worker organizations, better strategies or 
more generous budgets to enforcement agencies could simply substitute 
for collaboration with worker organizations and increase “outputs.” If 
this were only the case, co-enforcement is helpful, but not necessary. In 
addition, if this were the case, we could maintain a theory of enforce-
ment that separates the actions of labor inspectors from that of worker 
organizations without obscuring key elements of the regulatory process. 
 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See, e.g., Chris Ansell & Alison Gash, Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice, 18 
J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 547 (2008). 
 27 Philippe C. Schmitter, Interest Intermediation and Regime Governability in Contemporary 
Western Europe and North America, in ORGANIZING INTEREST IN WESTERN EUROPE: PLURALISM, 
CORPORATISM, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICS (Suzanne Berger ed., 1981). 
 28 Ansell & Gash, supra note 26, at 547. 
 29 See generally Ostrom, supra note 13. 
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This research finds that workers, worker organizations, and regu-
lators have capabilities that cannot be perfectly substituted for one an-
other, or could perhaps be partially substitutable at great cost.30 Addi-
tionally as elaborated further below, some of the attributes of state and 
society are non-substitutable because of trust and power. 
One must therefore ask: What capabilities do workers, worker or-
ganizations and states possess that the others either do not share or 
share only partially at great cost? Enforcement begins with workers on 
the “shop floor”: what they see, hear, and experience firsthand, and 
most critically, what they are willing to share, are instrumental to the 
ability of workers’ organizations and the state to identifying non-com-
pliance with labor standards. Workers have unique capabilities to en-
hance enforcement because they are present at the worksite every day, 
have tacit knowledge31 of the work process and firsthand experience 
with changes in working conditions and employer practices over time. 
They also are steeped in the culture of the workplace and have relation-
ships with other workers and supervisors. In the absence of “police pa-
trol” enforcement, in which investigators would be regularly walking 
their workplace beats, if any actor is poised to engage in the “fire alarm” 
model of enforcement contemplated by the political scientists 
McCubbins and Schwartz in the context of congressional oversight, it is 
workers at the workplace.32 
Certainly, worker knowledge could be at least partially substituted 
by having a full-time investigator in every workplace at all times, but 
this is costly and politically unfeasible. Additionally, our conception of 
worker participation in enforcement is that multiple workers would 
take part, geometrically increasing the chance that non-compliance 
would be found out, as opposed to having one investigator with respon-
sibility for monitoring an entire workplace. Worker participation is also 
important for keeping worker organizational engagement in enforce-
ment dynamic, bottom-up, and accountable. Finally, as Ostrom argues, 
given the higher cost of labor of public officials in comparison with the 
opportunity costs of workers spending some of their time engaged in 
 
 30 There are limits on what states can do on their own. The political scientist Joel Migdal 
cogently argued, “No matter how vaunted the bureaucracy, police, and military, officers of the 
state cannot stand on every corner ensuring that each person stop at the red light, drive on the 
right side of the road, cross at the crosswalk, refrain from stealing and drug dealing, and so on. 
Modern state leaders could easily find their institutions quickly overwhelmed by the enormity of 
the task of enforcement, even with vast bureaucracies.” JOEL S. MIGDAL, STATE IN SOCIETY: 
STUDYING HOW STATES AND SOCIETIES TRANSFORM AND CONSTITUTE ONE ANOTHER 252 (2001). 
 31 See generally MICHAEL POLANYI, THE TACIT DIMENSION (1966). 
 32 Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police 
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165–79 (1984). 
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enforcement, the optimal arrangement is to have the enforcement out-
put produced by some combination of inputs from both parties. 
Flowing from what we have stated above, one of the most commonly 
cited capabilities that worker organizations have is access to vast 
amounts of information on labor standards that would be difficult for 
state officials to gather alone.33 It is often only when the organization 
has vouched for the agency and worked with workers over time that 
vulnerable workers have been willing to file complaints with a full de-
scription of what has been occurring. Through relationships of trust be-
tween workers and organizations, investigators are able to gain access 
to the knowledge and information workers possess about violations. 
Worker organizations can play a critical role in monitoring and en-
forcement when they are place-based, relational, tutelary, participa-
tory, activist and strategic. By place-based, we mean grounded in spe-
cific geographic communities; by relational, we mean they focus on 
building relationships with and between workers, bringing groups of 
workers together and building bridges between groups of workers and 
the larger community;34 by tutelary, we mean the ability to teach work-
ers about their rights and how to assert them, and to teach investigators 
about the workforce and the industry; by participatory we mean they 
have workers actively engaged in the life of the organization; by activ-
ist, we mean they have a belief in the need to re-govern the market 
toward social ends and an orientation toward action; by strategic we 
mean that they have knowledge of their sectors, laws and regulations, 
how to work with government, and make the choice to focus some of 
their resources on enforcement work. 
Organizations with these capacities can acquire and pass along to 
investigators, through workers as well as their own research, special-
ized knowledge of industry structures and the range of sub-contracting 
arrangements and employment practices, as well as information on em-
ployers who are not complying with wage and hour and occupational 
safety and health laws. When worker organizations understand how in-
dustries function, they are able to trace the root causes of violations, 
which makes them powerful sources of expertise for inspectors who sel-
dom specialize in a specific sector. This understanding also allows 
 
 33 See Matthew Amengual, Pathways to Enforcement: Labor Inspectors Leveraging Linkages 
with Society in Argentina, 67 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3 (2014); Fine & Gordon, supra note 13; 
Janice Fine, Solving the Problem from Hell: Tripartism as a Strategy for Addressing Labour Stand-
ards Non-Compliance in the US, 50 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 813–44 (2014); Tess Hardy, Enrolling 
Non-State Actors to Improve Compliance with Minimum Employment Standards, 22 ECON. & LAB 
REL. REV. 117 (2011). 
 34 MARK R. WARREN, DRY BONES RATTLING: COMMUNITY BUILDING TO REVITALIZE AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY (Princeton Univ. Press 2001). 
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worker organizations to anticipate which sectors in the economy are 
likely to become hotspots.35 They can help gather information about 
firm practices, and through their relationships, networks and reputa-
tional credibility, encourage workers to file complaints with state and 
federal agencies. 
Worker organizations can also enhance the power of regulators in 
responding to, and preventing, violations in several ways. Beneath the 
veneer of neutral application of law, the street-level bureaucrats of reg-
ulatory agencies face a wide range of political pressures.36 While organ-
izational structures, such as civil service protection, can reduce such 
pressures, they can never be fully eliminated. Worker organizations can 
play an important role by acting as a countervailing power to employers 
during enforcement operations. For example, union leaders can push 
regulators to negotiate terms of compliance that are more favorable to 
employees. Finally, after the act of enforcement, the power of regulators 
is dimmed by the low probability of a repeat enforcement action. When 
labor inspectors move on to other firms or industries, worker organiza-
tions can continue to press employers to respect regulations. 
To reiterate and build upon our earlier points, as in the case of 
worker participation, some of the activities of organizations could be 
substitutable by the state, but only at great cost and likely with inferior 
results. But it is also clear that some of the attributes of worker organ-
izations are non-substitutable because of trust and power. Organiza-
tions have the trust of vulnerable workers that state agencies often 
lack. Worker organizations that are deeply rooted in their racial and 
ethnic, linguistic, geographic, sectoral, cultural or political communities 
are able to gain the trust of marginalized or undocumented workers who 
are often reticent to complain directly to government.37 Of course the 
nature of the collaboration between the organization and the state is of 
critical importance to retaining workers’ trust. The organization must 
avoid becoming simply an arm of the state; it must preserve its inde-
pendence and demonstrate its commitment first and foremost to re-
specting the will of the workers. Once we admit that the enforcement 
process is always at least somewhat politicized and that there are limits 
 
 35 For a detailed discussion of the ways in which worker centers and unions can enhance en-
forcement efforts, see Fine, supra note 33. 
 36 JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE ORGANIZATIONAL 
BASIS OF POLITICS (1989); MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICE (2d ed. 2010); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT (1989). 
 37 See David Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain? Complaints, Compliance, and the Problem 
of Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 2 (2005). 
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to the degree that bureaucratic norms can constrain street level bureau-
crats from exercising their own discretion, the inclusion of worker or-
ganizations can bring in power to support enforcement that cannot be 
given to the state no matter how many resources are available to it. 
They also have power to compel changes in firm behavior that the state 
does not always have or choose to exercise; that is, organizations exer-
cise moral power38 when they document and publicize egregious exam-
ples and patterns of exploitation and abuse, and hold specific employers 
responsible for them publicly. Fearing such reputational repercussions, 
some businesses respond to this pressure. 
State regulators, of course, also have unique capabilities and inde-
pendent powers.39 The power of the state to legally enforce depends 
upon fundamental attributes as the monopoly holder of coercive powers 
that can be used to induce compliance that worker organizations lack. 
The state has the independent power to set standards, to incentivize 
behavior and to compel firms to undertake improvements. State regu-
lators have the power to demand information, to investigate workplaces 
through on-site inspections of facilities and payroll records and to pun-
ish through the use of fines, suspensions, denial of licenses and closing 
down firms. Inspectors know the complexities of the laws they are en-
forcing and the procedures necessary to putting strong cases together. 
The state has the ability to empower societal groups by delegating to 
them certain rights and privileges.40 State regulators also have the ca-
pability, both operationally and politically, to enforce regulations where 
worker organizations are absent or weak. This capability is crucial be-
cause there will always be places and industries without strong worker 
organizations. Finally, by targeting sectors, citing employers, and pub-
licizing their enforcement actions, the state also has the unique power 
of legitimation41 of the claims of workers and worker organizations to 
the broader society. 
 
 38 JENNIFER JIHYE CHUN, ORGANIZING AT THE MARGINS: THE SYMBOLIC POLITICS OF LABOR IN 
SOUTH KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES (2009); JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: ORGANIZING 
COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE DREAM (2006); JAMES M. JASPER, THE ART OF MORAL PROTEST: 
CULTURE, BIOGRAPHY, AND CREATIVITY IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (1997); GENE SHARP, GANDHI 
WIELDS THE WEAPON OF MORAL POWER (THREE CASE STORIES) (1960). 
 39 We agree with the institutional analytical approach that posits an independent role for po-
litical institutions and takes into account both the efficacy of institutional design and, as March 
and Olsen argue: “Bureaucratic agencies, legislative committees, and appellate courts are arenas 
for contending social forces, but they are also collections of standard operating procedures and 
structures that define and defend values, norms, interests, identities and beliefs.” MARCH & 
OLSEN, supra note 36, at 16–19 (1989); BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 
1985). 
 40 Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 13; Fine & Gordon supra note 13. 
 41 JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS (2005). 
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In sum, this discussion suggests that to identify opportunities for 
enhancing enforcement it is essential for all parties to recognize that 
state regulators, workers, and worker organizations have non-substi-
tutable capabilities. When this is the case, the full potential for enforce-
ment cannot be achieved without including workers and worker organ-
izations no matter how many resources are allocated to regulators. 
B. Principle #2: Routinize Flows of Information and Resources across 
the State-Society Divide 
What needs to flow across the state-society divide to make enforce-
ment more effective? The analysis above suggests some starting points. 
To begin, regulators need to have access to information that worker or-
ganizations can provide at a granular level. Information-sharing was 
not emphasized by Ostrom or J&M, but it was of major import for Ayres 
and Braithwaite and it comes up repeatedly as an issue for organiza-
tions in our case studies of co-enforcement in labor standards enforce-
ment. Worker organizations that are actively bringing workers forward 
need to know not only what the regulatory agency is capable of doing 
and how it functions (more on this below) but also to be kept abreast of 
how cases are proceeding. When organizations facilitate complaints, 
but are not able to get information on how the case is proceeding, their 
credibility with the workers they have encouraged to step forward is 
undermined.42 After this happens repeatedly, organizations can begin 
to view filing complaints with the state as a last resort. 
Resources can also be key to extending the operational capabilities 
of both states and worker organizations. Worker organizations can pro-
vide inspectors with material resources, such as staff who go out to 
worksites, can interview workers and help them to fill out complaints, 
and can reconstruct payroll records for use by investigators. These re-
sources can make a tremendous difference for labor inspectorates that 
have large caseloads and lack sufficient budgets. Most sectors of the low 
wage economy are not represented by strong unions that can fight for 
enforcement resources. When resources flow from the state to society, 
however, regulatory partnerships can be used to strengthen the ability 
of worker organizations to support enforcement. Reinforcing worker or-
ganizations can also occur when the state devolves certain activities to 
worker organizations by providing the organizations with access that 
can help them gain and maintain members. 
 
 42 Interview with Jennifer Rosenbaum, Legal and Policy Director, National Guest Workers 
Alliance (July 26, 2013). 
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C. Principle #3: Prioritization of the Relationship, Clear 
Communication and Decision-Making Processes and Modulation 
of Demands 
Fundamentally, the success of co-enforcement depends upon strong 
relationships between the state agency and workers, worker organiza-
tions and high road firms.43 Trust, adaptation, accountability and com-
munication are key to these relationships. At the outset, as Ansell and 
Gash emphasized, it is critical for the parties to recognize the “starting 
conditions” of the collaboration including power differentials, what in-
centives to participation exist or do not exist, and whatever has gone 
before that has either created antagonism or paved the way toward co-
operation.44 In our research, organizational leaders seldom completely 
shared their true feelings about agency behavior directly with the spe-
cific agencies and vice versa. Additionally, they emphasized the neces-
sity of collaboration and sharing as much information as quickly as pos-
sible, but did not indicate to the agencies that knowing the status of the 
case as it progressed was essential to their ability to maintain credibil-
ity with workers and continue to expand cases. Government agencies 
emphasized that organizations need to understand and adapt to the 
pressures and constraints government must operate within, and have 
the capacity to add real value to investigations. But these agencies did 
not always say this directly to the groups. One veteran official empha-
sized the importance of choosing the right organization. The most effec-
tive partnerships were with organizations that, to paraphrase what 
many agency leaders said enforce in firms even though enforcement will 
not directly benefit members of the organization, “understood that 
when you are partnering with government, you have to work within the 
confines of government, not that government has to work within the 
broader confines of your organization.”45 
In their review of the literature, Ansell and Gash find that in rare 
cases negotiations take place organically without assistance, but that 
collaborative governance has not been possible in most cases without 
facilitative leaders on both sides who bring stakeholders together, set 
and maintain clear ground rules, build trust, facilitate dialogue, explore 
mutual gains, and work together in a collaborative spirit.46 Facilitative 
leaders, who have the skills to promote broad and active participation, 
 
 43 DARA O’ROURKE, COMMUNITY DRIVEN REGULATION: BALANCING DEVELOPMENT AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT IN VIETNAM 225 (2004). 
 44 Ansell & Gash, supra note 26, at 550. 
 45 Interview with Anonymous Agency Official. 
 46 Id. at 554. 
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productive group dynamics, and the process are especially important 
when the starting conditions are sub-optimal—such as when the incen-
tives for participation are weak, power and resources are asymmetri-
cally distributed or prior antagonisms between the actors are high. 
Whereas leaders are often understood as those capable of taking deci-
sive action, Ansell and Gash argue that the leadership focus of the col-
laborative leader is on promoting, safeguarding and stewarding the pro-
cess. 
D. Principle #4: Political Support to Create and Maintain 
Collaboration 
Political support for enforcement agencies is crucial because busi-
ness interests frequently push back against regulation and attempt to 
discredit regulators. Unions in the U.S. have long mobilized to defend 
the programs and budgets of labor standards enforcement agencies. As 
we elaborate below, coproduced enforcement requires additional sup-
port in the US because it is not seen as the norm. Therefore, there must 
be willingness and capacity among multiple actors to advocate for the 
partnerships. 
Co-enforcement requires ongoing external and internal political 
support. Partnerships do not form just because they can enhance the 
abilities of regulators and worker organizations to fulfill their stated 
goals. Instead, there needs to be a political willingness among multiple 
actors who advocate for partnerships and for funding of partnerships. 
Political support is crucial because as regulators and worker organiza-
tions collaborate in the process of enforcement, they necessarily cede 
some control over tasks that are key to their organizations. For in-
stance, the degree to which regulators accept cases from worker organ-
izations may reduce the ability of regulators to select and craft cases in 
ways that comply with formal organizational objectives, as well as the 
broader goals of the regulatory agency. Regulators also face the risk of 
being branded as acting in the interest of worker organizations instead 
of the public good. In addition, giving worker organizations access to 
the state can further their own organizational prerogatives, thus 
strengthening them in the medium to long term. This possibility makes 
collaborations especially politically sensitive. Similarly, worker organi-
zations need to see it in their own organizational interest to invest time 
and resources into the enforcement process. Sometimes this means 
waiting for the slow moving regulatory system. It also may mean taking 
a step back to allow the regulatory agency to enforce in firms even 
though enforcement will not directly benefit members of the organiza-
tion. 
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To identify ways in which co-enforcement may enhance enforce-
ment, it is necessary to analyze the relationships between state regula-
tors and organizations of civil society. At one end of the spectrum, the 
relationship can be formalized and worker organizations can be given 
wide-ranging powers. Tripartism, as envisioned by Ayres and 
Braithwaite, provides a specific public interest organization with a for-
mal and ongoing role in enforcement and provides access to the same 
information the regulator sees.47 Co-enforcement as envisioned by 
Ostrom, also favors formalization.48 
At the other end of the spectrum, relationships can be entirely in-
formal. Organizations and government can be in frequent communica-
tion, meet together, share information, and strategize without creating 
a structured agreement. Instrumental to informal partnerships are a 
shared interest in their value and some common organizational culture 
regarding collaboration, along with individual relationships between 
bureaucrats and worker organizations which often involve active 
boundary-spanning individuals49 who navigate both worlds of state reg-
ulators and worker organizations. These individuals do more than 
simply communicate and share information between the parties: they 
process information for both sides, using their discretion to act as gate-
keepers and facilitate cooperation.50 
The combinations of formal and informal attributes of these rela-
tionships have implications for the functioning of partnerships. Formal 
arrangements create clear sets of rules and procedures to govern part-
nerships. Formal structures can also alleviate concern on the part of 
state officials that close collaboration with civil society organizations 
(without official structures) could lead to charges of cronyism or favor-
itism. And when formal structures guarantee certain status for worker 
organizations, they can reduce concerns on the part of organizations 
that their credibility with workers is damaged if they encourage them 
to come forward but are then kept in the dark as to how their cases are 
proceeding.51 
 
 47 See generally Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 13. 
 48 See generally Ostrom, supra note 13. 
 49 Boundary spanners are individuals who are able to communicate across organizational 
boundaries because of their ability to learn local languages, coding schemes and specialized con-
ceptual frameworks and are “attuned to the contextual information on both sides of the bound-
ary . . . .” Michael L. Tushman & Thomas J. Scanlan, Boundary Spanning Individuals: Their Role 
in Information Transfer and Their Antecedents, 24 ACAD. MGMT. J. 289, 291–92 (1981). 
 50 Howard Aldrich & Diane Herker, Boundary Spanning Roles and Organization Structure, 2 
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 217 (1977). 
 51 Aldrich and Herker also argue that formalization serves a social control function because 
the programmed nature of the interactions is “partial insurance of boundary spanner consistency 
with organizational procedures, norms and goals. Members who interact freely with non-member 
07 FINE PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/17/17  8:23 PM 
158  THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2017 
 
While politics will always play a role in determining which groups 
can effectively partner with regulators, formal structures are important 
for weaker groups in particular.52 CG scholars argue that if significant 
power and resource imbalances between shareholders exist such that 
some are unable to participate in a meaningful way, there must be a 
commitment to a positive strategy of empowerment and representation 
of weaker or disadvantaged stakeholders or the project will not succeed. 
Formal arrangements are likely to be more robust than those that 
rely upon relationships between individuals at a specific political mo-
ment and thus are always contingent and temporary. Also, certainly in 
the US, it is less likely that resources will be shared when arrange-
ments are informal. Informal attributes of relationships differ in the 
types of creation costs. On the one hand, they can fly under the radar 
of partisan politics and fewer formal rules that can get in the way. This 
reduces the need to go through formal veto players, such as legislatures. 
On the other hand, informal relationships require time and investment 
by individual officials and their societal counterparts to develop collab-
orative arrangements without the support of official mandates. 
III. CO-ENFORCEMENT CASES 
A. The National Guestworkers Alliance (NGA) and the OSHA 
Walk-Around 
NGA was founded by the New Orleans Worker Center for Racial 
Justice (NOWCRJ), an organization of African American and immi-
grant workers. It began during the post-Katrina clean-up and rebuild-
ing phase during which thousands of immigrant workers were recruited 
to come to New Orleans to aid in the massive clean-up. At the time, 
although working conditions were particularly dangerous due to the 
storm damage, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) was under a federal order to cease all enforcement actions and 
engage only in “compliance assistance” activities. Workers could not file 
complaints to have their workplaces investigated and OSHA was barred 
from issuing complaints or fines against employers. Strikingly, while 
the DOL was running on a skeletal staff, federal immigration agents 
were engaging in aggressive enforcement efforts, further discouraging 
 
groups, particularly homogenous sets, are likely to develop attitudes consistent with those of the 
non-members, rather than of their focal organization. The existence of standard operating proce-
dures partially protects the organization against attitudes and behaviors that are not consistent 
with organizational objectives.” Aldrich and Herker, supra note 50, at 226. 
 52 This form of “stacking the deck” can facilitate co-enforcement and ensure access to the state 
by particular groups. Jonathan Bendor et al., Stacking the Deck: Bureaucratic Missions and Policy 
Design, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 873 (1987). 
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workers from reporting unsafe conditions or wage theft.53 During this 
period, the center was also contacted by guest workers charged thou-
sands of dollars by recruiters and then subjected to terrible abuse at 
luxury hotels damaged by the storm. Those who spoke up about the ex-
ploitative conditions were routinely threatened with deportation. 
In the face of these challenges, the Worker Center and NGA did 
pioneering work in calling attention to what was happening to the re-
construction workers, providing organizing assistance and expanding 
the use of labor and immigration laws to support them. As local African 
American workers and their families were displaced from their homes 
and locked out of employment, and immigrant workers both docu-
mented and undocumented were locked into employment by unscrupu-
lous recruiters and employers, the Worker Center and NGA’s signature 
strategy was to foster relationships, solidarity and common purpose be-
tween local workers, undocumented immigrant workers, and guest 
workers.54 
In the spring of 2011, 400 students from countries including China, 
Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, Ghana and Thailand 
were recruited at their universities to participate in the U.S. State De-
partment’s J-1 summer cultural exchange visa program.55 Each of the 
students paid between $3000 and $6000 to CETUSA, a State-depart-
ment certified recruiter and its international affiliates.56 Under the J-1 
program, work is supposed to be of secondary importance to educational 
and cultural exchange, but the students got an education of a different 
sort when they were forced to take up work as exploited, sub-minimum 
wage factory workers.57 It was a classic joint employer58 case: the stu-
 
 53 JJ Rosenbaum, Presentation at Rutgers Univ. Sch. of Mgmt. and Labor Rel. (Nov. 10, 2014); 
Mike Hall, House Hearing on Katrina Shows Massive Wage Abuse by No-Bid Contractors, AFL 
CIO NOWBLOG (June 26, 2007), http://www.mobilityagenda.org/katrina.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6 
VP-7AEE]. 
 54 Interview with Jacob Horwitz, Lead Organizer, NGA (July 23, 2013). 
 55 Julie Preston, Foreign Students in Work Visa Program Stage Walkout at Plant, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/us/18immig.html?pagewanted=all&_r 
[https://perma.cc/8FUF-H3JH]. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 “Joint employer” is when two or more companies share the status of employer of a single 
worker. The criteria that has been used to determine whether a joint employment situation exists 
include: whether separate entities share or codetermine matters governing essential terms and 
conditions of employment or employers meaningfully affect matters relating to the employment 
relationship such as hiring, firing, discipline, supervision and direction. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
WAGE & HOUR DIV., FACT SHEET #35: JOINT EMPLOYMENT UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 
(FLSA) AND MIGRANT AND SEASONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKER PROTECTION ACT (MSPA) (Jan. 
2016), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs35.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Z5B-3HK2]. 
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dents were brought to work at Eastern Distribution Center III, in Pal-
myra, Pennsylvania which is owned by the Hershey Co. but operated by 
Exel North American Logistics, a sizeable contract logistics provider 
with more than five hundred facilities in the US and Canada, which in 
turn contracted with SHS Staffing Solutions to bring in the foreign 
workers. The plant was entirely staffed by these J-1 students who left 
their countries during college breaks for three-month periods; it ran on 
a three shift, twenty-four hour a day schedule.59 The students were put 
to work packing Reese’s peanut butter cups, Kit-Kat bars and Hershey’s 
Kisses for promotional displays under extremely unsafe conditions.60 
Excessive assembly line speeds coupled with low staffing levels resulted 
in high rates of neck, back and arm injuries from lifting and carrying 
boxes, according to the OSHA joint employer complaint filed that sum-
mer by NGA on behalf of twelve named guest workers and over 400 
similarly situated workers.61 
NGA organizers and lawyers worked with the Department of Labor 
to share the information they were gathering from the guest workers, 
developing legal and policy strategies to remedy the situation.62 NGA 
organizers went apartment to apartment, talking to students about 
their living and working conditions, painstakingly constructing a pic-
ture of the complex supply chain relationships, documenting the prob-
lems students had experienced, teaching them about their labor and 
employment rights and strategizing with them about how to build the 
power it would take to win improvements.63 Together with NGA, stu-
dents worked collectively to map and document the violations by multi-
 
 59 See Preston, supra note 55. 
 60 Id. 
 61 The complaint charged Exel North American Logistics, Inc., SHS Onsite Solutions and Cul-
tural Exchange Travel, USA (CETUSA) with failing their general duty to furnish their employees 
“employment and place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or 
likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees” as required by the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act, as well as failure to keep records of injuries, as required by law. These 
details are drawn from the August 17, 2011 OSHA complaint filed by the NGA on behalf of student 
guestworkers against Exel North American Logistics, Inc., SHS Onsite Solutions and Cultural 
Exchange Travel, USA (CETUSA). See Jennifer Rosenbaum, Request for Revocation of Sponsor-
ship of Council for Educational Travel, USA (CETUSA) (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.guestworker 
alliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/WEB.-State-Dept-Complaint-J-1-workers-8.17.2011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BA5W-8BN3]; US Labor Department’s OSHA Cites 2 Companies, Proposes 
$288,000 in Fines for Workplace Safety and Health Violations Involving Foreign Students, OSHA 
(Feb. 13, 2012), https://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/osha/OSHA20120321.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
K6PA-8RS8]; Settlement Agreement, Solis v. Exel Inc., OSHRC (Dec. 31, 2012) (No. 12-0683), 
https://www.osha.gov/enforcement/cwsa/exel-inc-12312012 [https://perma.cc/4DQ7-W6EM]. 
 62 See Preston, supra note 55. 
 63 Id. 
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ple entities under multiple legal regimes, and to build a strategy to ex-
pose and change conditions at the plant.64 The students eventually went 
on strike to elevate their voice and press their demands for a serious 
investigation of working conditions at the packing plant.65 
The Department of Labor responded quickly by activating their 
Wage and Hour investigators in the region. With the help of the NGA 
organizers on the ground in Palmyra, who over their time had devel-
oped hundreds of contacts and the trust of many of the students, WHD 
investigators were able to meet and interview students outside the 
workplace and quickly open an investigation into their claims of mis-
treatment. “They really took a stance that dignified and empowered the 
workers,” said Julie Mao, one of the lawyers working in Palmyra66 Their 
collaboration with OSHA was a turning point in the campaign and 
broke important new ground. 
Recognizing the importance of employees being informed of govern-
ment inspections and directly consulted about their experiences of 
workplace hazards, congressional drafters wrote them into Section 8 of 
the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act, giving representatives 
authorized by employees the right to accompany Compliance Safety and 
Health Officers (CSHO) on inspections.67 This “walk-around” rule 
meant that OSHA inspectors, upon entering a facility, routinely asked 
for the highest-ranking union official at the plant to accompany them. 
At a time when they represented a third of the US workforce, the rule 
was largely assumed to apply to labor unions in the plants under in-
spection,68 but more recently, the Field Operations Manual was 
changed to broaden the definition of employee representative. It now 
says: 
an authorized representative of the employee bargaining unit 
such as a certified or recognized labor organization, an attorney 
acting for an employee or any other person acting in a bona fide 
representative capacity including . . . members of the clergy, so-
cial workers, spouses and other family members, and govern-
ment officials or nonprofit groups and organizations acting upon 
specific complaints and injuries from individuals who are em-
ployees.69  
 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Interview with Julie Mao (July 28, 2014). 
 67 S. REP. No. 91-1282 (1970). 
 68 Interview with Deborah Berkowitz (Mar. 7, 2014). 
 69 DAVID MICHAELS, OSHA INSTRUCTION, CPL-02-00-160, FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL, (Aug. 
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In practice however, unions and community organizations representing 
non-union employees had only rarely been granted the right to partici-
pate in walk-arounds. 
In the complaint filed on behalf of the J-1 students, NGA requested 
permission for three students and NGA’s legal director to participate as 
the employees’ representative in the OSHA walk-around.70 For the first 
time, OSHA granted the request. 
A narrow interpretation of the type of organization that was enti-
tled to participate on a walk-around was embraced under the Bush ad-
ministration in a 2003 opinion in response to a query from the Boiler-
makers Union. At that time, OSHA’s interpretation of Section 8 was 
that a union representative who had filed a complaint on behalf of a 
worker in a non-union facility did not have a right to accompany an 
OSHA CSHO on the inspection walk-around.71 Nevertheless, the 
NOWCRJ and NGA had applied several times to be the walk-around 
rep for workers it was working with. In 2011, in response to a query 
filed by the Health and Safety specialist at the United Steel Workers of 
America, OSHA arrived at a different interpretation, one that said that 
the Act provided that one or more workers could in fact “designate a 
person affiliated with a union or a community organization to act on 
their behalf as a walk-around representative” and that representative 
did not have to be a coworker.72 
Although Hershey opposed it, and Exel Inc. threatened to refuse 
the inspection, in the end OSHA designated Rosenbaum and three stu-
dent workers as walk-around representatives. Recounting how they be-
gan the inspection that day, Godwin Efobi, a medical student who was 
one of the walk-around representatives recalled how encouraging the 
agency investigators were that day, “OSHA told us ‘if you know those 
places where students usually have injuries, we want you to point them 
out to us. You are protected by us.’”73 Don’t worry if there is anything 
that is happening that isn’t the way it used to be. Just go on the floor 
 
2, 2016), https://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/Directive_pdf/CPL_02-00-160.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XHJ-
5ERL]. 
 70 OSHA, supra note 61. 
 71 John L. Henshaw, OSHA Interpretation of 1903.8 Letter to Milan Racic, Health and Safety 
Specialist of the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, OSHA (Mar. 7, 2003), https:// 
www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=24459 
[https://perma.cc/2YY4-946A]. 
 72 Richard E. Fairfax, OSHA Interpretation Letter Regarding Standards 1903.8, 1903.11, 
1952.10 and 1903.20 to Steve Salman, Health and Safety Specialist, United Steel, Paper and For-
estry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers Union, OSHA (Feb. 
21, 2013), https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETAT 
IONS&p_id=28604 [https://perma.cc/F6XY-WVTJ]. 
 73 Interview with Goodwin Efobi, OSHA Walk-around Rep. (July 28, 2014). 
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and if you see something different just come to us and point it out.’”74 
From Rosenbaum’s perspective, the agency’s findings were more accu-
rate as a result of the students’ participation in the walk-around be-
cause OSHA got “real-time” information from the students about prior-
ity areas for inspection and what had been changed in the plant prior 
to the inspection.75 Efobi recalled that: 
the first noticeable thing was the Exel Inc. staff, they were the 
ones supervising us. They were very courteous, it was like sur-
real . . . and then more significantly, the pace of the lines was 
almost like in slow motion or something like that. . . . The pace 
of work was something people could work at because it was nor-
mally so much faster.76 
As the group walked through the plant they were a visual affirmation 
that the students’ plight had been noted and that action was being 
taken; workers were relaxed and smiling, flashing thumbs up signs. 
In describing the significance of student participation in the walk-
around, Efobi said, “We felt it was a victory. . . . It was satisfying to 
come in there with the full weight of the law behind us.”77 From Rosen-
baum’s perspective, worker participation in the walk-around is a game-
changing intervention because it levels the playing field.78 Most low 
wage immigrant workers find themselves at a significant power disad-
vantage vis-a-vis their employers. 
Typically, your employer controls everything about the physical 
space, being able to bring the government in shows a shift in 
power that is visible to everyone in the plant. Filing a complaint 
isn’t visible, OSHA coming in by itself doesn’t change that in a 
transparent way, but if the worker is walking around with the 
investigator, giving her side of the story along with the em-
ployer, it just feels so fair, because government is in the middle 
and you both get to tell your side of the story.79 
Rosenbaum also emphasized that workers often have supply chain in-
formation critical to joint employer investigations which the employer 
may resist providing.80 
 
 74 Id. 
 75 Interview with JJ Rosenbaum, Nat’l Guest Workers Alliance (July 28–31, 2014). 
 76 Efobi, supra note 73. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Rosenbaum, supra note 75. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
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Despite her enthusiasm for expanded use of the new walk-around 
policy, Rosenbaum made it clear that it was important that workers’ 
centers adopt a flexible approach to how to work with OSHA in investi-
gations. “The critical point is that the investigative procedure makes 
sure OSHA is getting the information it needs from workers and em-
ployers in an uncoerced way.”81 Top officials at OSHA who were inter-
viewed for this study concurred, saying that from their perspective, the 
walk-around is not always the most critical component of an investiga-
tion for organizations to be involved in. From their perspective, workers 
do not always feel comfortable speaking their mind to investigators dur-
ing walk-arounds, so having worker centers participate in getting 
worker interviews offsite is often of greater value.82 
After a six-month investigation that culminated with the walka-
round, Exel was cited for nine violations, including six willful workplace 
safety and health violations at the Eastern Distribution Center III, with 
proposed penalties totaling $283,000.83 Exel was cited for failing to rec-
ord injuries and illnesses as required by law including forty-two serious 
injuries that had occurred over the past four years at the plant. OSHA 
also cited SHS Staffing Solutions for one serious violation:84 failing to 
provide training to employees on the lockout/tagout of energy sources, 
with a proposed penalty of $5000. CETUSA’s designation as a J-1 visa 
program sponsor was also terminated. In addition, the WHD found vio-
lations of the minimum wage and overtime provisions of FLSA due to 
excessive housing cost deductions and imposed additional civil mone-
tary penalties for repeat violations. As part of a joint settlement on the 
wage and hour violations with Exel, SHS, and CETUSA, Exel had to 
agree to implement a voluntary corporate-wide compliance program to 
review each of its facilities for FLSA and OSHA compliance, to provide 
training for managers and supervisors regarding FLSA and OSHA re-
quirements, to establish a hearing conservation program, eliminate in-
centive programs based on the number of reports of work-related inju-
ries or illnesses, to hire a qualified safety consultant and to create a 
permanent position within the company with authority for overseeing 
this work. 
In making the judgment to include NGA and the students in the 
walk-around in Palmyra, OSHA recognized the unique role each was 
 
 81 Id. 
 82 Interview with Deborah Berkowitz (Aug. 14, 2014). 
 83 Willful violations are those committed with intentional knowledge or voluntary disregard 
for the law’s requirements, or with plain indifference to worker safety and health. 
 84 A serious violation occurs when there is substantial probability that death or serious phys-
ical harm could result from a hazard about which the employer knew or should know. 
07 FINE PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/17/17  8:23 PM 
143] ENFORCING LABOR STANDARDS 165 
 
playing in identifying safety problems and bolstering the hundreds of 
student guest workers to come forward with the facts of the case, de-
spite their fear of being blacklisted and deported. OSHA valued the re-
lationship and in the face of strong organizing by NGA, the agency took 
the political risk to include the organization and the students in the 
walk-around. NGA prioritized partnering with government on enforce-
ment. OSHA is in the process of drafting changes to its Field Operations 
Manual that should include the new walk-around interpretation and 
administrative language that encourages more widespread inclusion of 
worker organizations in investigations. In November of 2014, NGA’s 
Legal Director was appointed as a labor representative to the Whistle-
blower Advisory Committee—a recognition of the expertise residing in 
worker centers in developing effective whistleblower and anti-retalia-
tion policies within OSHA.85 
Worker and worker center participation in the walk-around must 
be understood as one tactic in a larger strategy of engagement with 
health and safety issues that can empower workers to organize and im-
prove conditions at the enterprise-wide level and to drive change 
throughout their supply chains. In fact, walk-around rights for workers, 
unions and worker centers in non-union settings are part of a larger set 
of strategies pioneered by Eric Frumin, Health and Safety Director for 
Change to Win, the late Tony Mazzochi of the Oil Chemical and Atomic 
Workers Union, Peg Seminario, the AFL-CIO Health and Safety Direc-
tor and other individuals and unions within the labor movement who 
have long utilized health and safety as an organizing tool in non-union 
workplaces. For example, it was during the campaign to organize J.P. 
Stevens in 1979, that the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers 
Union (ACTWU) first established the right of non-union workers to 
choose unions to represent them under OSHA. ACTWU, the Steelwork-
ers, the United Farm Workers, UNITE HERE, SEIU, the Teamsters 
and most recently, UFCW in its Our Walmart campaign, have all en-
gaged in organizing campaigns in which health and safety issues fig-
ured prominently as a tool to build worker power and call the public’s 
attention to unsafe working conditions. In all of these cases unions rep-
resented non-union workers, despite not being the bargaining agent, in 
filing complaints and getting citations.86 The other advantage to OSHA 
as an organizing tool is that workers who go on strike to protest work-
place hazards are protected for work refusals and for concerted activity. 
 
 85 Secretary of Labor Announces New Members of the Whistleblower Protection Advisory Com-
mittee, OSHA (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.osha.gov/news/newsreleases/trade/10202014 [https:// 
perma.cc/67Z3-FE42]. 
 86 Interviews with Eric Frumin (Apr. 3, 16, 2014 & June 4, 5, 16, 2014). 
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Given the increase in worker centers engaging in health and safety 
work and being supported through the Susan Harwood program at 
OSHA, there is a ripe opportunity for deeper collaboration between 
worker centers and unions on the linkages between enforcement and 
organizing in health and safety. It is essential that there be mutual 
learning and sharing of innovative practices developed by unions over 
many years in health and safety organizing with worker centers and 
other “alt-labor” groups. Through the AFL-CIO, Change to Win, COSH 
and other networks, Seminario, Frumin and others have been sharing 
this history and knowledge with the worker center movement but there 
is a need to develop deeper, more deliberate opportunities for reaching 
and training new generations of health and safety researchers and or-
ganizers.87 
B. The Los Angeles Black Worker Center Community Compliance 
and Monitoring Project 
The L.A. Black Worker Center (LABWC) was founded in 2010 to 
build organized power and grassroots leadership among Black workers 
and the extended community to reverse disproportionate levels of un-
employment and underemployment which stand at a staggering 50% in 
the Los Angeles Black community.88 The organization’s goals are to in-
crease access to quality careers, address employment discrimination 
and improve conditions in industries that employ Black workers in L.A. 
LABWC has targeted the construction sector because it provides access 
to real careers and cannot be outsourced, but has had a history of ex-
cluding Blacks.89 In the early 1990’s, Waldinger and Bailey found that 
reliance by the construction unions, and the industry as a whole, on 
informal social networks for both recruitment and training have made 
it difficult for African American workers to break into construction.90 In 
Los Angeles, only 4.9% of construction workers are Black, despite com-
prising 9% of the population. As Will Scott, Joint Apprenticeship Coor-
dinator of Sheetmetal Workers Local 105 put it “In my career which 
 
 87 Eric Frumin, et al., Health and Safety Tools in Organizing Campaigns, Presentation at the 
National Council for Occupational Safety and Health Training (Dec. 6–7, 2012). 
 88 For the groundbreaking study that catalyzed the founding of the LA Black Worker Center, 
see Steven C. Pitts, Job Quality and Black Workers: An Examination of the San Francisco Bay 
Area, Los Angeles, Chicago and New York, UC Berkeley Center for Labor Res. and Educ. (2d 
ed.2007), http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/pdf/2007/blackworkers_07.pdf [https://perma.cc/CD43-
TV43]. 
 89 Thomas J. Sugrue, Affirmative Action from Below: Civil Rights, the Building Trades, and 
the Politics of Racial Equality in the Urban North, 1945-1969, 91 J. AM. HIST. 143–73 (2004); Roger 
Waldinger & Thomas Bailey, The Continuing Significance of Race: Racial Conflict and Racial Dis-
crimination in Construction, 19 POL. & SOC’Y 291–323 (1991). 
 90 Waldinger & Bailey, supra note 89, at 293. 
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spans now twenty-four years, it was very unlikely to find other black 
workers on these construction sites.” Scott also described the effects of 
the racially exclusive culture: 
There were very few and if you did see other black workers you 
were almost cautious not to draw yourself to them . . . There was 
fear of . . . your reputation. You didn’t want to be seen as gath-
ering or slacking by being sociable on the jobsite with other 
blacks . . . .91 
LABWC’s beginning strategy for opening up construction has been to 
focus on diversifying the enormous public sector projects that are un-
derway in the City and County. 
The organization has its roots in the groundbreaking work of the 
UC Berkeley and Los Angeles Labor Centers as well as the Los Angeles 
Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE). In 2012 it was a leading partic-
ipant in a labor/community coalition that won the first metropolitan 
transit authority Project Labor Agreement (PLA) with national tar-
geted hiring goals for federally-funded, Federal Transit Administration 
approved projects in the nation. It is mammoth—covering $70 billion 
worth of projects and projected to create more than 270,000 jobs. Fi-
nancing comes partially through Measure R, the half-cent sales tax that 
was approved by LA County voters in 2008 and partially through fed-
eral funding from the Federal Transit Administration, which requires 
national targeted hiring goals.92 In addition to federal affirmative ac-
tion requirements, the LA County Metropolitan Transit Authority also 
adopted a Construction Careers Policy intended to encourage construc-
tion and employment and training opportunities “in ways calculated to 
mitigate the harms caused by geographically concentrated poverty, un-
employment and underemployment . . . .”93 
As the debate on the PLA unfolded, the LABWC focused on “creat-
ing a climate for this issue of black workers to be prioritized,” said Lola 
Smallwood Cuevas, Executive Director of the LABWC. “We mobilized 
out-of-work black construction workers to come out and testify about 
why they needed to be a part of it and how the Metro board could help 
make a change,” she continued. As a result of their work, including the 
establishment of a Black Labor Construction Council made up of Black 
 
 91 Interview with Will Scott (Dec. 4, 2014). 
 92 Executive Order 11246 requires affirmative action hiring for minorities and women on all 
federally funded projects. Exec. Order No. 11,264, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319, 12,935 (Sept. 24, 1965). 
 93 L.A. CTY. METRO. TRANSP. ADMIN., PROJECT LABOR AGREEMENT, http://media.metro.net/ 
about_us/pla/images/Project_Labor_Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/7L84-WY9H]. 
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construction workers, and the alliances they forged with elected offi-
cials, and the local Sheet Metal, IBEW and Painters unions, the result-
ing PLA included a 10% “disadvantaged worker” component.94 Adopted 
unanimously, LABWC believed that the organization needed to set its 
sights on robust implementation. “We did not call it a victory when we 
were able to see this adopted,” said Smallwood Cuevas, “because we felt 
enforcement was the key.” 
The LABWC’s goal is to double the representation of Black con-
struction workers on transit projects, particularly those that align with 
predominantly Black neighborhoods. Since construction commenced on 
the $2.058 billion Crenshaw/LAX Transportation Project in early 2014, 
LABWC has been developing strategies strengthening the pipeline of 
Black workers into construction, providing ongoing support to ensure 
success and monitoring the numbers of workers hired and employed on 
the jobsite and their experiences on the job. “We expect these worksites 
to look like the census tracks they are working in. We started with the 
Crenshaw line, because if we can’t do it in Crenshaw, where can we do 
it?” said Smallwood Cuevas. The organization’s benchmark for success 
on the Crenshaw project is 25% Black, 5% female and 20% apprentice 
participation. It has been extremely focused on how to monitor and en-
force the terms of the PLA. 
The LABWC created the Community Compliance and Monitoring 
Program to ensure that Metro, the contractor (Walsh-Shea), any sub-
contractors, and the unions comply with the spirit of the PLA, which is 
intended to tackle the barriers that have kept Blacks and women out of 
the trades. “We are doing grassroots monitoring and enforcement of the 
agreement because a lot of enforcement has been dismantled,” said 
Smallwood Cuevas. “Unions have so many things they are ensuring—
workers in the right classifications and trust funds being paid into. Who 
will prioritize exclusion? Diversity often comes down low on the list of 
things that folks are actually monitoring and enforcing and tracking,” 
she observed. “We want to understand what are those policies that help 
us ramp up enforcement. What are the tools that help us combat the 
notion that we don’t have the political will to enforce civil rights laws in 
the U.S?” In the first phase of the project, the organization developed a 
 
 94 Prevented by the passage of Proposition 209 from setting explicit racial targets, the disad-
vantaged worker language is defined to mean someone who resides in an economically disadvan-
taged or extremely economically disadvantaged area and faces at least two of the following barriers 
to employment: 1) homelessness; 2) being a custodial single parent; 3) receiving public assistance; 
4) lacking a GED or high school diploma; 5) having a criminal record or other involvement with 
the criminal justice system; 6) suffering from chronic unemployment; 7) emancipated from the 
foster care system; 8) being a veteran of the Iraq/Afghanistan war or 9) being an apprentice with 
less than 15% of the hours required to graduate to journey level Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit 
Authority and Los Angeles. Id. 
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report card tool for researching, evaluating and grading contractors bid-
ding on the Crenshaw work based on previous adherence to equity, 
transparency and accountability and then moved on to the hiring pro-
cess and outcomes. 
The PLA requires the contractor to hire a Jobs Coordinator whose 
job is to facilitate implementation of the Targeted Hiring Require-
ments.95 Metro releases a monthly Targeted Worker Report, but it is 
based on self-report data from contractors. Working with researchers 
from the University of Southern California, the organization developed 
a Community Compliance Monitoring Toolkit that laid out a methodol-
ogy for carrying out their own oversight, generating their own numbers 
and then comparing it to the Metro Targeted Worker Reports.96 Addi-
tionally, given the length and depth of the problem of Black employ-
ment in the trades, the organization pushed for the establishment of an 
oversight table that is regularly bringing Metro, contractors, elected of-
ficials, EEOC representatives and City agencies together to review the 
recruitment and retention numbers, consider strategies for raising 
them, and probe the issues that affect Black workers on the worksite, 
in real time.97 “Through conversations with our members we have been 
identifying what is needed . . . from day one the subcontractors need to 
know the policy and we need to be in the pre-jobs meetings, showing 
them how discrimination happens,” said Smallwood Cuevas. “If work-
ers have to solicit their work, they can contact the primary or the sub-
contractor, but we need to know whether their information is being 
taken or whether they are being turned away . . . or why people are 
being jumped on the hiring list . . .” she said. The Black Labor Construc-
tion Council gives them a unique capacity to flag these issues. From 
Metro’s perspective, LABWC brings unique capacities to the monitoring 
and enforcement process. “They are right in the middle of the Crenshaw 
 
 95 The Jobs Coordinator always works for the contractor, not for Metro. On the Crenshaw/LAX 
project, that position is held by PV Jobs which is responsible for: generating and maintaining spe-
cific programs targeting residents for construction opportunities at the project, attending jobs fairs 
and/or community meetings to outreach to the community regarding opportunities available for 
the union, provide assistance to clients for entry into the unions, generate and maintain program 
specific documentation for the project’s request for skilled workers and for reporting and tracking 
purposes, provide referrals that meet the geographic project requirements for low income, and 
specific skill set requirements, coordinate and collect monthly reports indicating conformance of 
each hiring requirement, and assume full administrative responsibilities for program implemen-
tation of hire and apprentice requirements. Project Labor Agreement and Construction Careers 
Policy, METRO, https://www.metro.net/about/pla/ [https://perma.cc/D88P-YFWW] (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2017). 
 96 WEI WANG, ET AL., GUIDELINES ON COMMUNITY COMPLIANCE MONITORING TOOLKIT: A 
COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH PROJECT BY THE LOS ANGELES BLACK WORKER CENTER AND 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (May 15, 2014). 
 97 L.A. BLACK WORKER CTR., INCREASING LABOR STANDARDS AND DIVERSITY IN LOS ANGELES 
THROUGH CO-ENFORCEMENT (2015). 
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corridor and can advocate for the goals of the PLA and refer workers to 
the jobs coordinators. They are great partners and are providing things 
to make our PLA successful,” said Miguel Cabral, Head of Strategic 
Business, PLA and Construction Careers. 
Due to the peculiar nature of construction, which happens in 
stages, it is particularly important to review numbers frequently and 
over the entire life of the project. Workers are often hired and employed 
to do specific jobs for limited periods of time. Close monitoring and data 
analysis meant that the organization was able to note patterns over 
time, finding that representation of Black workers had fluctuated dra-
matically on the project: from a high of 78% in November of 2013 down 
to 12% by May of 2014. LABWC was able to raise concerns that Black 
workers were being employed largely in the early stages but when site 
prepping was finished and prime contractor hours were introduced, the 
percentage of Black workers dropped off precipitously, suggesting that 
they were not being hired for the long-term work.98 
Although very important, from the organization’s perspective, 
numbers reveal only part of the story. It wanted to have a finer-grained 
view in order to understand the reasons behind the fluctuations. 
Through the oversight table, the parties can delve more deeply into 
workers experiences. They can make sure that workers don’t get passed 
over for employment when they walk up to the jobsite, or are bullied or 
pushed out once they are there or quit out of frustration from lack of 
information, training or discriminatory treatment on the job. 
When we can sit together with the key players, we can figure out 
things like: why were three workers fired last week . . . and iden-
tify problems that can arise like “I am trying to figure out what 
I am supposed to do but the instructions are unclear to me” or 
we find out that the safety meetings were conducted only in 
Spanish . . . .  
said Smallwood Cuevas. 
Beyond the oversight table itself, LABWC has won access to all of 
the pre-jobs meetings conducted by Metro with contractors, and is work-
ing on getting clear signage that provides information about who is in 
charge on the jobsite, and gaining access to workers on the jobsite. They 
believe that building community and peer mentoring is instrumental to 
workers staying on the job. While protocol requires LABWC members 
 
 98 L.A. BLACK WORKER CTR., COMMUNITY COMPLIANCE AND MONITORING REPORT 3 (Apr. 
2014). 
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to undergo safety training and sign in and out with the primary con-
tractor, Metro is very supportive of the organization being able to go on 
job sites. “We have been facilitating this process for the BWC because 
we want to create a culture of transparency here. We want to put the 
most accurate numbers out there that we can, and BWC is doing 
that . . .” said Cabral. 
From what I have seen them do already in terms of marketing, 
referral, in terms of going on site and doing validation, and 
providing supportive services to clients who have been placed on 
the job, publishing a quarterly report on Metro’s PLA summa-
rizing where we are on each project, they have done a lot. I see 
them as a partner on our PLA . . . holding us accountable and 
making sure that we are monitoring and enforcing. 
LABWC has also been working on setting up a complaint system. It has 
received training from the EEOC as well as the DOL on what kind of 
information is most useful for bringing cases against contractors that 
violate labor standards. 
In addition to the work it is doing on the public transit PLA, 
LABWC is working with a coalition of organizations to pass a wage theft 
law that would create an OLSE-like entity in Los Angeles, would in-
clude equal employment opportunity enforcement and have a strong co-
enforcement component. 
IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
This paper has argued that the crisis of compliance in low wage 
industries will not be solved through enforcement initiatives under-
taken by the state alone. Re-embedding norms of compliance will re-
quire creative collaboration between government, workers, civil society 
organizations and high road firms. Development of effective enforce-
ment models has become increasingly urgent as more labor mandates 
are being passed at the local and state levels. Cities are considering 
expanding the enforcement role of existing agencies, the establishment 
of new institutions, and formal contracts with worker organizations and 
legal non-profits to assist in enforcement activities. In regions and sec-
tors where public agencies have historically been weak, innovative 
place-based and sector-specific private monitoring regimes linked to 
strong market consequences have emerged. Organizations are finding 
new pathways to worker power through representation in private in-
spection regimes, settlement agreements, direct action, worker-to-
worker education and public policy. Deep collaboration and trust have 
been instrumental to the success of co-enforcement efforts, and ongoing 
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public relationships between worker organizations and government 
bodies are at the center of each of the two cases. Agency leaders and 
investigators find that access to workers and their willingness to come 
forward greatly increased when they were in relationship with organi-
zations the workers trusted. Likewise, when they felt they could trust 
organizations, government officials articulated strong advantages to 
working closely with them. 
 Formalization of Co-enforcement 
Organizations playing a formal role have enabled more effective 
monitoring and enforcement of labor and employment laws in low-wage 
sectors. Government officials are largely positive about what organiza-
tions are bringing to the table. Concern on an agency’s part that close 
collaboration with civil society organizations could lead to charges of 
favoritism or breaches of confidentiality reinforces the importance of 
formalization of the relationship with a clear set of rules and proce-
dures. However, while formalization may be necessary, it is not suffi-
cient when the commitment to the collaboration on either side is weak. 
In interviews, most worker center and labor leaders expressed a 
strong preference for formalization over informal agreements. They felt 
that lacking formal agreements, agencies would be less likely to rou-
tinely involve the organizations and would proceed instead on an ad-
hoc, case-by-case manner. They were also concerned that if agencies 
were not officially committed to providing groups with information, re-
sources, a seat at the table and an ongoing role in monitoring and en-
forcement, they would fall back on entrenched practices. Additionally, 
they worried that without written policies, organizations would be serv-
ing at the pleasure of individuals; cooperation could be discontinued at 
any time and relationships would not be institutionalized for the longer 
run. Informal cooperation, they also felt, made it less likely that their 
organizations could alter the relations of power in their sectors and 
begin to create a culture of compliance among employers. 
Government agencies, for the most part, were more dubious about 
formal agreements. Generally speaking, they worried that formalizing 
a relationship with a worker organization in particular would jeopard-
ize perceptions of them as neutral parties. There is no doubt that gov-
ernment agencies in the US tend to be uncomfortable with explicit part-
nerships and formal arrangements with worker organizations. 
Generally speaking, they worry that formalizing a relationship with a 
worker organization would jeopardize the perception of them as neutral 
parties. While beyond the scope of this paper, this “administrative” or 
“bureaucratic neutrality” mindset with its deep-seated notions about 
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the proper role of state agencies in the US can be traced back to at least 
three sources: court-centric ideas of the rule of law as a source of legiti-
macy were baked into the early administrative state, a strict separation 
of politics and administration dating back to Woodrow Wilson, and sci-
entific management principles imported into government administra-
tion during the Progressive Era.99 
 Resourcing Organizations 
In the two profiled cases, organizations were paying for their en-
forcement activities out of existing budgets comprised largely of funding 
from foundations. Other case studies profile examples of government 
funding playing a key role in a worker organization’s co-enforcement 
activities.100 Like formalization, government providing financial sup-
port to organizations in order to engage in education and enforcement 
activities has been controversial in some quarters. But there is no par-
ticular reason that government funding in this area should be any more 
controversial than other programs that fund civil society organizations 
to operate programs that assist government in achieving its goals. 
These grant programs are governed by formal rules—organizations 
must apply, they must meet specific selection criteria and are required 
to submit regular progress reports. As a practical matter, funding is 
necessary because low wage worker organizations are modestly funded, 
enforcement-related work is very time-consuming and competes for re-
sources with other critical activities like organizing and service provi-
sion. 
 
 99 The common law court was enshrined as the ideal against which administrative agencies 
were to be judged. The courts’ influence “reached deep into the thought processes of administrators 
and taught them to justify their actions in a peculiarly legalistic way.” This mental model combined 
with Wilsonian notions of a science of administration and Taylorist tenets of scientific manage-
ment to become central tropes of the administrative state that emerged in the United States be-
tween 1900-1940. Taylor’s “Principles of Scientific Management” helped to create and sustain the 
idea of a dichotomy between politics and administration. They formed the basis of the recommen-
dations of President Taft’s 1912 commission on efficiency and economy which sought to implement 
the principles of scientific management in government in order to improve its performance. The 
first two textbooks on public administration presented the field based on scientific grounds of gov-
ernance and asserted the importance of scientific principles to public administration. See Wasim 
Al-Habil, The Development of the Concept of the ‘One Best Method’ in Public Administration, 2 J. 
PUB. ADMIN. & POL’Y RES. 96–102 (2010); DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900-1940 (2014); Woodrow Wilson, The Study of 
Administration, 56 POL. SCI. Q. 197–222 (1887). 
 100 For additional case studies, see Matthew Amengual & Janice Fine, Co-enforcing Labor 
Standards: The Unique Contributions of State and Worker Organizations in Argentina and the 
United States, 11 REG. & GOVERNANCE 129 (2017); Janice Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards in 
Partnership with Civil Society: Can Co-enforcement Succeed Where the State Alone Has Failed?, 45 
POL. & SOC’Y 359 (2017); Janice Fine & Gregory Lyon, Segmentation and the Role of Labor Stand-
ards Enforcement in Immigration Reform, 5 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 431 (2017). 
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 New State Actors 
In LA, working with LABWC, the Metropolitan Transit Authority 
became the first metropolitan transit authority in the nation to sign a 
Project Labor Agreement with affirmative action hiring goals, a con-
struction careers policy and a disadvantaged worker component. In San 
Francisco, an entirely new institution has been created that has a broad 
mandate and significant powers including the ability to involve other 
city agencies in enforcing labor laws. OLSE has substantial investiga-
tive capacity and also provides funding for community organizations to 
engage in co-enforcement of enforcement. Building a local institution 
and involving organizations on the ground in labor standards enforce-
ment is strongly supported by Luce’s research, which documents much 
higher levels of compliance with the living wage in cities in which there 
was a local government entity involved in enforcement and community 
organizations involved in implementation.101 
 Absence of High Road Employers in Low-Wage Sectors 
Strong, collaborative relationships between worker organizations 
and businesses have only just begun to emerge. Strikingly, some of 
these are with firms that were once highly opposed to the involvement 
of workers’ organizations in their sectors, others are with firms at the 
top of supply chains that have agreed to require their contractors and 
suppliers to comply and cease doing business with them if they do not. 
Unfortunately, high road firms joining with civil society and govern-
ment in strengthening enforcement are rare in sectors that have 
adopted low wages, part-time work and just in time scheduling as core 
components of their business models. However, business participation 
is not always present. These cases—NGA and the warehousing compa-
nies in Pennsylvania, and the LABWC, Metro and Walsh-Shea (the gen-
eral contractor on the Crenshaw Line)—involved worker organizations 
going to the top of network supply chains and engaging firms in some 
form of co-enforcement, albeit mostly after significant pressure was 
brought to bear upon them. In LABWC and Pennsylvania, elected offi-
cials or government agencies played a major role in compelling firms to 
participate. These developments hold out the promise that the experi-
ence of co-enforcement itself might be transformative in terms of how 
companies see themselves and wish to be seen by others. 
 
 101 See generally STEPHANIE LUCE, FIGHTING FOR A LIVING WAGE (2004). 
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 Scant Role for Workers in Enforcement 
Of those cases that were based upon formal agreements, only one 
included an official role for workers at the worksite. OSHA provides in-
dividual workers the right to ask for their employer’s health and safety 
records and the walk-around rule allows workers to choose their own 
representatives. As discussed above, with a presence on every worksite 
and experiential knowledge of work processes and employer practices, 
workers have unique capabilities to bring to enforcement. They are par-
ticularly important to represent in co-enforcement schemes and provide 
whistleblower protections to, because many of the most vulnerable 
workers are at worksites that are not in relationship with any sort of 
worker or community organization. It is critical for local, state and fed-
eral labor standards policies and programs to establish new models for 
worker voice at the workplace level, as another means for workers to be 
empowered to come together collectively to monitor and enforce labor 
standards.102 
 The Connection between Enforcement and Raising Standards 
These cases shed light on the relationship between enforcement 
and organizing and between defending minimum standards and raising 
them. The two organizations profiled here, like the bulk of worker cen-
ters across the country, become involved in enforcement of wage and 
hour and health and safety laws because so many of the people they 
work with have been exploited, and because taking on these cases is a 
concrete way to build relationships with workers and gain their trust. 
Many times, what begins as a wage claim evolves into a direct-action 
campaign on an employer or group of employers, or public policy cam-
paigns at the state and local levels. Wage claims and wage theft cam-
paigns on individual employers are part of a cycle, as organizations 
evolve from taking all comers, to requiring workers to participate in the 
organization, to treating cases differently depending upon their strate-
gic significance, to ultimately spending the most time on those cases 
that will best support a broader campaign to raise standards by spot-
lighting current conditions. 
 
 102 There have been debates within the U.S. labor movement about whether the establishment 
of alternative institutions for employee voice at the worksite level will undermine union prospects. 
There have also been major legal debates about whether works councils, in particular, would vio-
late the 8a2 prohibition in the National Labor Relations Act against company unions. In the con-
text of Volkswagen’s recent overtures, Harvard law professor Benjamin Sachs has argued that 
there are legal strategies for doing so. Benjamin Sachs, Minority Unionism (sort of) Comes to VW 
Chattanooga, ON LAB.: WORKERS, UNIONS, & POL. (Nov. 12, 2014), https://onlabor.org/ 
2014/11/12/minority-unionism-sort-of-comes-to-vw-chattanooga/ [https://perma.cc/863K-BL69]. 
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Organizations know that for many workers, just ensuring they ac-
tually receive the minimum wage is an improvement, and the necessary 
first step to raising the floor. They also know they cannot win improve-
ments in a sector unless there is an actual floor to begin with. In the 
building trades, garment and janitorial sectors, union organizing cam-
paigns often began the same way—with efforts to rid the labor market 
of “bottom-feeders” who engaged in unfair competition through busi-
ness models that flouted wage and hour and health and safety laws. 
Today, low wage worker organizations trace a similar trajectory that 
begins with reestablishing a floor. They do this through workers learn-
ing their rights under the law and asserting them individually and col-
lectively, gaining the confidence that comes with the state moving into 
the labor market in a more aggressive way and validating their claims 
of mistreatment. As this work evolves, organizations ratchet up de-
mands on employers beyond statutory minimums. Sometimes it is 
through direct action on employers, lawsuits and settlement agree-
ments; sometimes it is through public policy campaigns that enshrine 
new rights and wage standards; sometimes it is through unionization 
efforts; and often times, it is through combinations of all of them. As 
discussed above, regulatory unionism—an approach that combines the 
setting of a wage and collective bargaining rights and incentives—en-
capsulates this approach. This kind of approach is reflected in the Fast 
Food Forward and Fight for Fifteen campaigns, which put forward de-
mands for $15 an hour in the fast food and homecare sectors and de-
mand the right to a union for workers in such sectors. 
The crisis of compliance in low wage industries will not be solved 
through enforcement initiatives undertaken by the state alone. Re-em-
bedding a norm of compliance will require creative collaboration be-
tween government, workers, civil society organizations and high road 
firms. This study provides concrete evidence for the promise of collabo-
ration between the state and civil society. 
